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How to Explain the "Implicit




The Supreme Court has as of late taken renewed interest in
what inventions or discoveries are deserving of entry into the patent
system. Section 101 of Title 35 opens the door to "[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
Certain things-now referenced by the Court as "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"-necessarily fall outside the
statute's scope. The question is, why? Not why as a matter of policy,
but why as a matter of law. The Court has not yet picked (or at least,
articulated) any particular legal justification for discovering or
creating these "Implicit exceptions" to § 101. Upon close examination,
the several rationales present in the Court's opinions are not altogether
satisfying. Collectively, though, they have swayed the entire Court.
This Article explores the Court's unanimous acceptance of the implicit
exceptions as an aggressive use of the constitutional avoidance
doctrine: broad patents on things too close to "abstract ideas" or "laws
of nature" might impede progress, which might violate the preamble of
the Intellectual Property Clause. Such interpretive methodology
admits of no limiting principle.
* Associate at Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld. Law Clerk to the Honorable
Pauline Newman, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2012-13), and the
Honorable Legrome Davis, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(2011-12). J.D., NYU School of Law, 2011. The views expressed in this Article are mine (and
mine alone, as far as I know). All errors are mine, too.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has as of late taken renewed interest in
what inventions or discoveries are deserving of entry into the patent
system. The Court's most recent foray into the subject will allow the
Justices to decide whether, and to what extent, computer- and
software-related inventions may be patented.1 Section 101 of Title 35
states the criteria for patent eligibility:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
2
Certain things-now referenced by the Court as "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"-necessarily fall outside the
statute's scope. 3 The question is, why? Not why as a matter of policy;
we can all understand the inclination to prevent or eliminate "bad"
patents, patents so broad or vague that they should never have been
granted.4 Rather, why as a matter of law? What legal theories, what
1. See CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc),
cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (Dec. 6, 2013).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
3. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1292, 1300
(2012)).
4. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2012), for the substantive criteria of patentability,
the "conditions and requirements of this title" as referenced in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); see also
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We
Change?--The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 64 (2006) (commenting that
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canons of statutory construction, justify the "implicit exceptions" to
§ 101?5
On this question, the Court has been elusive. The Court's
opinions offer a glimpse of several justifications for the implicit
exceptions, but only a glimpse. The Court has not yet engaged the
issue in depth. This is an observation, not a criticism. Although all
nine sitting Justices apparently agree that the implicit exceptions
exist-Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. in
2013 and Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
in 2012 were unanimous on this point-it would be unsurprising if
views diverged as to the proper legal underpinnings for such
exceptions. Where there is consensus on the result, but not the
reason, silence may prevail.
But there must be some justification, grounded in law, for the
exceptions to § 101. The alternative would compel a conclusion that
the Court, without dissent, has assumed the mantle of patent
policymaker. That is difficult to believe, for such a maneuver would
"defy[] all sound conception of the proper role of judges."6 This Article
attempts to explain the Court's rationale for recognizing (or creating,
depending on one's perspective) implicit exceptions to the statutory
classes of patent eligible subject matter. Understanding the Court's
legal bases for the exceptions may help in understanding their scope
and thus the scope of § 101 itself.7 This might prove useful, even if
articulation of a bright-line rule on patent eligibility is impossible. In
the words of Judge Learned Hand, who lamented a similar difficulty
in distinguishing between un-copyrightable ideas and copyrightable
expression: "Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can."
8
the issuance of "bad" patents "has important economic consequences, including inefficient
resource allocation and significant harm to economic growth"); Sean B. Seymore, The
Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990, 1038-40 (2013) (discussing policy
implications of poor patent quality, including "uncertainty throughout the patent system,"
increased rent-seeking behavior, and high litigation costs).
5. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (quoting Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293) ("We have
'long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable."').
6. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1959 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. I express no view on the wisdom of the implicit exceptions, or whether they should,
as a matter of first principles, be construed broadly or narrowly. My objective is less ambitious. I
hope to explain what is, not what should be. Given my past service at the Federal Circuit, this
Article does not discuss any of that court's many opinions concerning patent eligibility.
8. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Thirty more
years of judicial experience did nothing to change Judge Hand's mind: "Obviously, no principle
can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its
,expression.' Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin
Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960) (Hand, J.).
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Although no single explanation for the implicit exceptions is
entirely satisfying, the Court's unanimity on the exceptions' validity
may flow from an aggressive use of the constitutional avoidance
doctrine. The Court has not expressly invoked the doctrine in
interpreting § 101, but the Court's patent eligibility jurisprudence
reflects an effort to reconcile the statute's broad language with the
Intellectual Property Clause's admonition "to promote ... progress."9
II. THE CURIOUS NATURE OF THE IMPLICIT EXCEPTIONS TO
35 U.S.C. §101
We have recently learned that isolated DNA is not eligible for
patent protection. 10 The same goes for processes that fail to "do
significantly more than simply describe ... natural relations," such as
the relationship between a particular drug and the concentrations of
its metabolites in the blood.11 So too, for processes which "explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."12 All of these are
outside § 101's ambit, because they do not "add enough" to the "law of
nature" or "abstract idea" on which they rest.13
As understood by the current Court, "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas" are "implicit exceptions" to § 101.14
That was not always the Court's understanding. To say that an
exception is implicit in a statute suggests that it was always there; the
Court found it, but did not create it. Earlier opinions reflect a more
active judicial role.
For example, the Court's 2010 opinion in Bilski v. Kappos
states that "[t]he Court's precedents provide three specific exceptions
to § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas."'15 "Providing" the exceptions through
"precedent" seems closer to creation than to discovery. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty states that "[tihe laws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable," similarly
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
10. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
11. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296-97
(2012).
12. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
13. See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297.
14. See Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116; Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
15. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980)).
[Vol. 16:2:353356
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acknowledging the Court's part in crafting the exceptions.16
Gottschalk v. Benson refers to the exclusion of abstract ideas from
§ 101 as a "longstanding rule," not an "implicit exception" to the
statute. 
17
The Court first used the "implicit exception" label to describe
the limits of § 101 in Prometheus.i8 Justice Breyer spoke for a
unanimous Court, and his authorship likely explains the emergence of
the "implicit exception" concept. The phrase "implicit exception" is
something of a Breyer-ism. It shows up only a handful of times in the
U.S. Reports,1 9 and is usually attributable to Justice Breyer.20 Thus,
the new nomenclature may not reveal a substantive change in the
Court's thinking about § 101-a new belief that the exceptions are
Congress-created and Court-located, instead of Court-imposed. It may
instead be a function of the draftsman. Nonetheless, the "implicit
exception" language has stuck; Justice Thomas quoted it for the
again-unanimous Court in Myriad.
21
The exceptions themselves have changed over time. The
presently preferred terminology is "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas."22 The Court first used this particular
formulation in Diamond v. Diehr.23 Chakrabarty states a small
variation, with "physical phenomena" taking the place of "natural
16. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 93 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112-21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853)).
17. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("[a]n idea of itself is not patentable" (quoting
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874))).
18. See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1289.
19. Seventeen, according to both Westlaw and Lexis.
20. See, e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 240 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that statutory conflicts may be resolved "by reading a later more
specific statute as creating an implicit exception to" an earlier statute (citing Osborn v. Haley,
549 U.S. 225, 243-44 (2007))); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005) (Breyer, J.) ("These
considerations of linguistic specificity, history, and comity led the Court to find an implicit
exception from § 1983' s otherwise broad scope for actions that lie 'within the core of habeas
corpus." (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973))); FCC v. NextWave Personal
Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 317 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Well over a century ago, the
Court interpreted a statute that forbade knowing and willful obstruction of the mail as
containing an implicit exception permitting a local sheriff to arrest a mail carrier." (citing United
States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 485-87 (1868))); Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153
(2001) (Breyer, J.) ("First, the language of the Agreement militates against an implicit exception,
for it is absolute."); United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997) (Breyer, J.) (stating that
statute that "sets forth its limitations in a highly detailed technical manner ... cannot easily be
read as containing implicit exceptions").
21. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
22. See id.; Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
23. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
VAND. J ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 16:2:353
phenomena."24 Other variations are numerous; some are collected in
the US Patent and Trademark Office's (USPTO) Manual of Patent
Examination Procedure (MPEP):
[A] claimed invention must not be directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions,
which have been specifically excluded from patent eligibility by the courts. These
judicially recognized exceptions include scientific truths, abstract principles, abstract
intellectual concepts, laws of nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas, mental
processes, processes of human thinking, and systems that depend for their operation on
human intelligence alone.
2 5
It is difficult, in the abstract, to state a meaningful distinction among,
say, an "abstract principle," an "abstract intellectual concept," an
"abstract idea," and a "mental process." As applied, certain of the
Court's earlier formulations of the implicit exceptions do not square
particularly well with the Court's current § 101 jurisprudence. For
example, although "the concept of hedging risk and the application of
that concept to energy markets" may fairly be characterized as an
"abstract idea,"26 risk hedging is neither a "fundamental truth" nor
"an original cause. '27
These malleable statutory exceptions are an oddity, as the
Court usually emphasizes the primacy of statutory text and "ordinary
meaning" in statutory construction. The following statement of the
law is typical of the current Court: "As in any statutory construction
case, we start, of course, with the statutory text, and proceed from the
understanding that unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are
generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning. '28
This methodology of statutory interpretation is pervasive; it is not
limited to any specific context, or associated with any individual
Justice. 29 And it is used to interpret the patent laws, no less than any
other:
24. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
25. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 706.03(a) (8th ed. rev. 9, Aug.
2012).
26. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229 (2010).
27. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
28. See Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.) (quoting BP Am.
Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
29. See, e.g., Levin v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1224, 1231 (2013) (Ginsburg, J.) ("In
determining the meaning of a statute, we look first to its language, giving the words used their
ordinary meaning." (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990))); Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012) (Kagan, J.) ("We begin 'where all
such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself .... And we consider each
question in the context of the entire statute." (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)) (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)));
Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1457 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., joined by
Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must
be the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry
358
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This Court has more than once cautioned that courts should not read into the patent
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed. In patent law,
as in all statutory construction, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as
taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.
3 0
The Court's recent patent-eligibility opinions "start" with the
statute itself, in that the Court's recitation of § 101 precedes the
substantive analysis in each case. 31 However, the Court's discussion
on the merits is directed almost entirely towards whether a certain
invention or discovery does or does not fall within an implicit
exception to the statute. Statutory language and "ordinary meaning"
take a backseat. How the implicit exceptions fit within § 101's
"expansive" language is little discussed. 32
III. THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE IMPLICIT EXCEPTIONS
The Court's opinions hint at several justifications for the
implicit exceptions to § 101, but it cannot be said that the Court has
adopted any particular one to the exclusion of the others. Each given
rationale for curbing patent eligibility has its strengths and
weaknesses.
into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished." (quoting
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992))); Schindler Elevator Corp. v.
United States ex rel. Kirk, 131 S. Ct. 1885, 1891 (2011) (Thomas, J.) ('Statutory construction
must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."' (quoting Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009))); Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1284 (2011) (Alito, J.)
('We give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an
indication Congress intended them to bear some different import."' (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000))); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 458-59 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ('We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute
are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete."' (quoting
Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992))); Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,
552 U.S. 214, 228 (2008) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter & Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
("Statutory interpretation, from beginning to end, requires respect for the text.").
30. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981))
(internal alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1670
(interpreting Hatch-Waxman statute); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(noting that patent law is not special when it comes to injunctions); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002) (noting that well-pleaded complaint rule applies in
patent cases, too).
31. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Bilski,
130 S. Ct. at 3225.
32. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 ('In choosing such expansive terms ... modified by the
comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide
scope."' (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980))).
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A. Stare Decisis
In Bilski, the Court stated that the exceptions "have defined
the reach of the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going
back 150 years," citing the Court's 1853 Le Roy v. Tatham opinion.
33
Other opinions note that the exceptions are "longstanding,"
34
"well-established,"35 "long held,"' 36 and "long-established,"37 invoking
legitimacy through history. However, stare decisis has the most force
when the law is well-settled. 38 It has always been the case that
certain things-Le Roy called them "fundamental truth[s]," "original
cause[s]," and "motive[s]"-are not patentable.3 9 However, the content
of these categories, these "principle[s] in the abstract," has not been
fixed over time; Le Roy presciently warned that "[t]he word principle
is used by elementary writers on patent subjects, and sometimes in
adjudications of courts, with such a want of precision in its
application, as to mislead."40 The uncertain and inconsistent scope of
the implicit exceptions weakens the stare decisis claim.
The usual justification for stare decisis is that "in most matters
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right."41  Of course, the corollary is that in some
matters, correctness is more important than stability. It has also been
said that "stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation has
special force, for Congress remains free to alter what [the courts] have
33. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75
(1852)).
34. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (citing Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v.
Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)).
35. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
36. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
37. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
38. See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 766 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting application of stare decisis when "there is no applicable rule of law that is settled");
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("We approach the reconsideration of decisions of
this Court with the utmost caution. Stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that 'in most matters
it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right."'
(citations omitted) (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997))).
39. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1852).
40. Id. at 174.
41. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 408 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (citing Nat'l Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102 (1880)), overruled in part by
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
[Vol. 16:2:353360
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done."42 Even so, application of statutory stare decisis reflects a policy
judgment, not an "inexorable" command.
43
The shifting scope of the statutory exceptions can be seen in
several ways. Consider the "preemption" concern so prominent in the
Court's recent § 101 opinions.44 Over 100 years ago, in the Telephone
Cases, the Court refused to allow the possibility of preemption to
define the scope of patent eligibility:
It may be that electricity cannot be used at all for the transmission of speech, except in
the way Bell has discovered, and that therefore, practically, his patent gives him its
exclusive use for that purpose; but that does not make his claim one for the use of
electricity distinct from the particular process with which it is connected in his patent. It
will, if true, show more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it will not
invalidate his patent.
4 5
In O'Reilly v. Morse, the Court recognized the problem of "too broad"
patents,46 but solved that problem by relying on the enablement
requirement, now codified in § 112, not by creating general exceptions
to patent eligibility:
Indeed, if the eighth claim of the patentee can be maintained, there was no necessity for
any specification, further than to say that he had discovered that, by using the motive
power of electro-magnetism, he could print intelligible characters at any distance. We
presume it will be admitted on all hands, that no patent could have issued on such a
specification. Yet this claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is outside of
it, and the patentee claims beyond it. And if it stands, it must stand simply on the
ground that the broad terms abovementioned were a sufficient description, and entitled
42. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,
172-73 (1989)). Query whether such a rule still makes sense, in light of the oft-lamented state of
disharmony and gridlock in the legislative branch.
43. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 233-34 (1961) (plurality opinion). The
"prudential and pragmatic considerations" that may inform the policy judgment include
"whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability"; "whether
the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation"; "whether related principles of law have
so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; and
"whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application or justification." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965);
United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1989); Burnet, 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
These considerations assume the existence of an "old rule" settled by precedent. That
assumption may be incorrect in the § 101 context, since the scope of the implicit exceptions-as
understood by the courts and the USPTO-has changed over time.
44. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) (stating that the implicit exceptions guard against the "considerable danger that the
grant of patents would 'tie up' the use of such [basic] tools and thereby 'inhibit future innovation
premised upon them."' (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1301 (2012))).
45. Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 535 (1888).
46. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853).
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him to a patent in terms equally broad. In our judgment the act of Congress cannot be
so construed.
47
With respect to biotechnology, the USPTO has been granting gene
patents for over thirty years. 48 Thus, the Court's determination in
Myriad holding isolated DNA categorically unpatentable was contrary
to the well-settled expectations of the innovation community. Without
a stable background rule, the traditional justifications for stare decisis
do not apply.
The USPTO's MPEP likewise reflects that the agency's
understanding of § 101 has changed over time. The original MPEP
(1948-49) did not mention implicit exceptions to patent eligibility,
such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, abstract ideas, or the like.
The most pertinent passage simply stated that "[a] method which
produces an intangible result, such as transmitting speech by a
telephone comes within this definition [of Art] also."49  The first
revision, in 1949, was more detailed. It listed the following as
"nonstatutory subject matter": (1) printed matter; (2) a naturally
occurring article, defined as "a thing occurring in nature, which is
substantially unaltered," such as a "shrimp with the head and
digestive tract removed"; (3) a method of doing business, even though
it is "seemingly within the category of an 'art' or method"; and (4) a
scientific principle, "divorced from any tangible structure."
50
The USPTO's description of patent eligibility remained
substantially the same until 1980, at which time the MPEP was
amended to account for the Court's decision in Chakrabarty.51 While
the USPTO quoted Chakrabarty's statement that "the laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not
patentable," the agency also explained that the "test set down by the
Court for patentable subject matter in this area is whether the living
47. O'Reilly, 56 U.S. at 119-20. Breadth was also the concern in Gottshalk v. Benson, in
which the Court held that a method "for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into
pure binary numerals" was not patent eligible. See Gottshalk, 409 U.S. 63, 68, 72 (1972)
(describing the claim as "so abstract and sweeping" as to "wholly pre-empt the mathematical
formula").
48. See Vincent Y. Ling, Patently Ours? Constitutional Challenges to Gene Patents, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 813, 813 (2012) (observing that the first gene patent was granted in 1982, and
about 40,000 more have been granted since then).
49. Original MPEP § 3-2 (1948-49), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/
mpep/oldEORO_300.pdf. No citation was provided for this statement, although it appears to be
based on the Court's decision in The Telephone Cases.
50. MPEP § 706.03(a) (1st ed. rev. 1, Nov. 1949), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/oldIElRO700.pdf.
51. MPEP § 2105 (4th ed. rev. 3, July 1980), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
officeslpac/mpep/oldIE4R3_2100.pdf. This revision did not discuss the Court's opinions in Benson
(1972) or Flook (1978).
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matter is the result of human intervention."52 The USPTO advised
that it would decide § 101 issues "on a case-by-case basis,"
commenting that it would be "inappropriate to try to attempt to set
forth here in advance the exact parameters to be followed."
5 3
In 1981, the MPEP was amended again, this time in response
to the Court's decision in Diehr. The USPTO stated that the Diehr
decision "significantly affect[s] an examiner's analysis under 35 U.S.C.
101 of patent applications involving mathematical equations,
mathematical algorithms and computer programs."54  The USPTO
"gleaned" certain "significant points of law" from the Diehr opinion,
including that patent eligibility is not determined by dissecting the
claims:
The "claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into
old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the
analysis." ... 'The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls
within the 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter."
5 5
Compare this understanding of the statute to the Court's present
understanding, in which the novelty of various "elements or steps in a
process" drives the § 101 inquiry:
[The Court's precedents] insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law
also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an
"inventive concept," sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself.... [Merely] well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the
field [is not enough].
5 6
In 1995, the USPTO eliminated the statement that "business
methods" are categorically excluded from patent eligibility.57 The
other exclusions-for "printed matter," "naturally occurring article[s],"
and "scientific principle[s]"-were retained.58  The revision also
contained an expanded discussion of the patent eligibility of
"computer-implemented inventions" to "respond to recent changes in
the law. '59 In 2001, the USPTO acknowledged that "[o]ffice personnel
52. See MPEP § 2105 (4th ed. rev. 3, July 1980), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/oldlE4R3_2100.pdf.
53. See id.
54. MPEP § 2110 (4th ed. rev. 8, Oct. 1981), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/oldIE4R8_2100.pdf.
55. Id. (emphasis added by USPTO) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 209 USPQ 1 (1981)).
56. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
57. See MPEP § 706.03(a) (6th ed. rev. 1, Sept. 1995) available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/old/E6Rl_700.pdf.
58. See id.
59. Id. § 2106 (6th ed. rev. 1, Sept. 1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/old/E6Rl_2100.pdf.
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have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed to methods of
doing business."60 The USPTO advised that "[c]laims should not be
categorized as methods of doing business. Instead, such claims should
be treated like any other process claims, pursuant to these Guidelines
when relevant."
61
The current edition of the MPEP, published in August 2012,
includes the USPTO's most exhaustive discussion of § 101 to date. 62
There are now approximately thirty pages devoted to "subject matter
eligibility."63 The agency's present interpretation of the statute bears
little resemblance to the guidance it once provided. Recall the original
MPEP stated that "a method which produces an intangible result" is
within the statutory definition of Art, without mentioning an implicit
exception to patent eligibility.6 4 The section on patentable subject
matter consisted of a single page.65
The empirical evidence supports the notion that the § 101
requirement has become more demanding. For many years, questions
of patent eligibility under § 101 were rarely raised, in either the
USPTO or the courts. The patent community seemingly saw § 101 as
a low bar, and the implicit exceptions to patent eligible subject matter
as narrow. In recent years, that understanding has changed. Section
101 challenges have increased exponentially both at the USPTO's
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)-formerly the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI)-and in litigation, as shown in the
"Number of PTAB (BPAI) Decisions Citing 35 U.S.C. 101" and
"Number of District Court Cases Citing 35 U.S.C. 101" tables below:66
60. MPEP § 2106 (8th ed., Aug. 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/old/E8R0_2100.pdf.
61. See id.
62. See MPEP §§ 706.03, 2103, 2106 (8th ed. rev. 9, Aug. 2012).
63. Id.
64. See Original MPEP § 3-2 (1948-49), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/oldIEOR0_300.pdf.
65. See id. § 3.
66. Data was collected using Keycite and Shepard's on Westlaw and Lexis, respectively.
The 2013 numbers were projected using data through mid-July.
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This data is consistent with the Court's emphasis on § 101 as a
significant limit on patentability. The implicit exceptions have more
bite than ever before. Given the unpredictable breadth of the
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
statutory exceptions, as well as their less-than-longstanding
importance to those who participate in the patent system, reliance on
stare decisis alone seems inadequate to justify their persistence. The
exceptions have changed too much-in content and in name-to be
considered a well-settled rule of law, immune from full
reconsideration.
B. Avoiding Absurd Results
This rationale-cabining § 101 to avoid patents perceived to be
absurd-figures most prominently in Justice Stevens's concurrence in
Bilski, the risk-hedging case.67 The concurring Justices 68 agreed that
the claims in question were not patent eligible, but would have gone
further than the majority, reasoning that "a claim that merely
describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a 'process'
under § 101."69 The concurrence criticized the Court's reliance on
implicit statutory exceptions to decide the subject matter eligibility
question, worrying that the Court's analysis "can only cause
mischief."7
0
Justice Stevens noted the Court's expansion of the implicit
exceptions, for risk hedging is not a "principle in the abstract," a
"fundamental truth," or an "abstract idea" in the genre of a
mathematical formula:
Although I happen to agree that petitioners seek to patent an abstract idea, the Court
does not show how this conclusion follows "clear[ly]," ... from our case law. The patent
now before us is not for "[a] principle, in the abstract," or a "fundamental truth." Nor
does it claim the sort of phenomenon of nature or abstract idea that was embodied by
the mathematical formula at issue in Gottschalk v. Benson and in [Parker v.] Flook.
7 1
The concurrence stated a concern that "what constitutes an
unpatentable abstract idea" is unclear and cautioned that
abstractness should not be confused with breadth. Justice Stevens
criticized the Court for "artificially limit[ing] petitioners' claims to
hedging, and then conclud[ing] that hedging is an abstract idea rather
than a term that describes a category of processes including
petitioners' claims."
72
67. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3232 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. See id.
69. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978)) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67
(1972)).
72. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Stevens expressed concern that the Court failed to
provide "a satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable
abstract idea":
73
[A] rule that broadly-phrased claims cannot constitute patentable processes could call
into question our approval of Alexander Graham Bell's famous fifth claim on "[t]he
method of, and apparatus for, transmitting vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as
herein described, by causing electrical undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of
the air accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, substantially as set forth.
'7 4
In making the case that business methods are per se ineligible
under § 101, the concurrence states-numerous times-that a
contrary interpretation of the statute would be "absurd" or "comical."
Justice Stevens noted that, if taken literally, the Court's broad
definition of process would mean that "[alnything that constitutes a
series of steps would be patentable so long as it is novel, non-obvious,
and described with specificity" before stating that "the opinion cannot
be taken literally on this point."
75
Justice Stevens expanded on the so-called absurdity at various
points throughout the opinion:
[T]he [Court's] approach would render § 101 almost comical. A process for training a
dog, a series of dance steps, a method of shooting a basketball, maybe even words,
stories, or songs if framed as the steps of typing letters or uttering sounds-all would be
patent-eligible. I am confident that the term "process" in § 101 is not nearly so
capacious.
76
The Court attempts to avoid such absurd results by stating that these "[c]oncerns" "can
be met by making sure that the claim meets the requirements of § 101." Because the
only limitation on the plain meaning of "process" that the Court acknowledges explicitly
is the bar on abstract ideas, laws of nature, and the like, it is presumably this limitation
that is left to stand between all conceivable human activity and patent monopolies. But
many processes that would make for absurd patents are not abstract ideas. Nor can the
requirements of novelty, nonobviousness, and particular description pick up the slack. A
great deal of human activity was at some time novel and nonobvious.
7 7
[A]lthough certain processes, such as those related to the technology of the time, might
have been considered patentable, it is possible that against this background, it would
have been seen as absurd for an entrepreneur to file a patent on methods of conducting
business.
7 8
While Justice Stevens used the absurdity doctrine to justify a business
method exception to § 101, a similar argument could be made to
explain the implicit exceptions for abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
the like. The common thread is that none of these exceptions fit
74. Id. at 3236 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 531
(1888)).
75. Id. at 3235 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 3238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 3238 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
78. Id. at 3245 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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comfortably within the statutory text, which states without
qualification that "any new and useful process" is eligible for
examination on the merits.
79
The absurdity doctrine comes into play when the Court
determines that Congress cannot have meant what it said.80 If a
certain reading of a statute would lead to "absurd" consequences, that
reading can be avoided, even if it appears to be the most "natural" or
"ordinary" meaning of the law.81 Various formulations of the doctrine
have been stated, some narrow, some not.
On one end of the spectrum, it has been said that a court may
"correct" a statute only when Congress made a "scrivener's error," and
the statute as written serves no "plausible purpose."82  When the
language of the statute is plain, "judicial inquiry is complete except in
rare and exceptional circumstances," such as "where the application of
the statute as written will produce a result 'demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters."'83
The doctrine has also been used more loosely; consequences
believed to be in tension with the "object" of the statute are labeled
"absurd." The Court's statement in Holy Trinity Church v. United
States is paradigmatic:
79. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
80. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998) ("Acceptance of the
Government's new-found reading of [the statute] 'would produce an absurd and unjust result
which Congress could not have intended."' (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S.
564 (1982))).
81. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("It is true
that interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if
alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available." (citing United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. 310 U.S. 534, 542-43 (1940); Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308
U.S. 389, 394 (1940))); Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965)
("Unquestionably the courts, in interpreting a statute, have some scope for adopting a restricted
rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning would lead
to absurd results or would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute." (citations and internal
alterations omitted)), superseded by statute, Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat.
487.
82. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 19 n.2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Note
that I am discussing what was a plausible congressional purpose in enacting this language-not
what I necessarily think was the real one. I search for a plausible purpose because a text without
one may represent a 'scrivener's error' that we may properly correct." (citing Green v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528-29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); United
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Union Bank v.
Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (The "plain text of the statute" prevails
absent a "scrivener's error' producing an absurd result.").
83. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (citing Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n,
481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987); Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 187 (1978)).
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The language of the act, if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If a
literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as
to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words. The object designed to be
reached by the act must limit and control the literal import of the terms and phrases
employed.
8 4
It is a stretch to say that § 101 is absurd unless it excludes, for
example, a method of hedging risk in energy markets (Bilski) or
dosing a particular drug according to its rate of metabolic breakdown
(Prometheus). These are practical applications of "abstract ideas" or
"laws of nature," not disembodied concepts. "Useful" advances are the
bread and butter of the patent system.8 5 While it may be absurd to
interpret § 101 to encompass fundamental principles such as gravity
or electricity, it is at least plausible that Congress intended the
statute to encompass applications of these principles-even if the
applications seem obvious, once the principles are understood. Thus,
although the absurdity doctrine may support certain limited
exceptions for true fundamental principles, it does not necessarily
mandate an inquiry into whether an invention or discovery "add[s]
enough" to the principle to warrant further scrutiny under the other
statutory provisions.
86
The question is not whether Congress could have intended
patents on things like hedging risk, or "training a dog," or "a series of
dance steps. 87 It is whether Congress could have intended patents on
such things, provided they were new, nonobVious, and
well-described.8 8  Context matters in statutory interpretation,89 and
84. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892).
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
86. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297
(2012).
87. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3238 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112. The Court has in the past shown a willingness to deal
with "bad" patents without resorting to the implicit exceptions. For example, in Dann v.
Johnston, the Court found "no need to treat" the extensively briefed question of "the general
patentability of computer programs," since the claims were obvious under § 103. 425 U.S. 219,
220 (1976). The claims were directed to a "machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank
checks and deposits." Id. However, there is a concern-legitimate, in my opinion-that the
normal screens for novelty and non-obviousness don't work particularly well for business method
claims "because business methods are both vague and not confined to any one industry, [and)
there is not a well-confined body of prior art to consult." Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3256 n.55 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (citing Dreyfuss, Are Business Methods Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268-70 (2000); Eisenberg, Analyze This: A Law and
Economics Agenda for the Patent System, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2081, 2090 (2000); Merges, Property
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589-90
(1999)) (noting an argument made in academic debate).
89. See Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (2012)
("Statutory interpretation focuses on 'the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."' (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997))).
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when § 101 is viewed in concert with the other statutory criteria of
patentability, it is at least debatable whether the implicit exceptions
are necessary to avoid absurd results.
C. A Textual Basis
By the terms of the statute, an invention or discovery must be
"new and useful" to be patent eligible. 90 This language may provide a
textual hook for the implicit exceptions. For example, it would be fair
to characterize a "law of nature" (gravity, electricity, etc.) as
preexisting-i.e., not "new"-even if just discovered. Some of the
language in Le Roy v. Tatham is in accord:
[T]he processes used to extract, modify, and concentrate natural agencies [such as
electricity], constitute the invention. The elements of the power exist; the invention is
not in discovering them, but in applying them to useful objects.
91
Benson similarly relies on the "new and useful" language to justify the
natural law exception. 9
2
This textual approach has several shortcomings. First, as
recognized by the Court in Bilski, while the exceptions may be
"consistent" with the "statutory text," they are not "required" by it.93
Section 101 covers both inventions and discoveries. 94  Invention
connotes creation;95 discovery, on the other hand, suggests finding
(perhaps for the first time) something that was already there.96 It is
possible, then, that "new" in § 101 includes "newly discovered," as in
the firsf realization of a previously unknown natural law, or the first
understanding of the medicinal properties of a plant lurking in the
depths of the rainforest. It is difficult to reconcile the "or discovers"
language in § 101 with the implicit exceptions.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
91. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
92. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("If there is to be invention from such
a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature to a new and useful end."'
(quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948))).
93. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225; see also Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wandering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism and the Missed
Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1292 (2011)
(criticizing Bilski's "effort to shoehorn patentable subject matter into a superficial textual mold[,
which] obfuscates patentable subject matter boundaries").
94. 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers").
95. Invent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.comldictionary/invent (defining "invent" as "to produce (as something useful) for the first
time through the use of the imagination or of ingenious thinking and experiment").
96. Discover, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.comldictionary/discover (defining "discover" as "to make known or visible," or "to obtain
sight or knowledge of for the first time").
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Furthermore, the Court has expressly disavowed the inclusion
of any "novelty" requirement in § 101. In Diehr, the Court stated:
It has been urged that novelty is an appropriate consideration under § 101. Presumably,
this argument results from the language in § 101 referring to any "new and useful"
process, machine, etc. Section 101, however, is a general statement of the type of subject
matter that is eligible for patent protection "subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title." Specific conditions for patentability follow and § 102 covers in detail the
conditions relating to novelty. The question therefore of whether a particular invention
is novel is "wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory
subject matter."
9 7
And, even if certain implicit exceptions-laws of nature,
physical phenomena-can be justified as not "new," others-most
notably, "abstract ideas"--cannot. Gravity exists, independent of
Newton and his apple. A method of hedging risk, however, is not
free-floating in the ether. It is a human creation, "new" to the first
person to conceive of it.98
The Court's belief that isolated DNA is not "new" played an
important role in the § 101 analysis in Myriad. Speaking for the
Court, Justice Thomas emphasized the Court's obligation to
"determine whether Myriad's patents claim any 'new and useful...
composition of matter,' or instead claim naturally occurring
phenomena."99 Comparing the invention of Chakrabarty to Myriad's
patents, the opinion noted that "[t]he Chakrabarty bacterium was new
'with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature...
due to the additional plasmids and resultant capacity for degrading
oil.' In this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create anything."100
Justice Thomas characterized much of Myriad's work as
discovery: "Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes
97. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189-90 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961
(Cust. & Pat. App. 1979)). Justice Stevens reiterated this point in his concurrence in Bilski:
"[T]he fact that hedging is long prevalent in our system of commerce cannot justify the Court's
conclusion, as the proper construction of § 101 does not involve the familiar issue of novelty that
arises under § 102." 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quotation marks, and internal
alterations omitted) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978)).
98. See Menell, supra note 93 at 1300-01 (2011) (noting that Benson's binary
conversion algorithm was both new and useful, for "his discovery had not been publicly known or
used in the United States, nor patented or described in a printed publication anywhere in the
world, prior to his patent," and "provided specific, substantial, and credible benefits to society");
Douglas L. Rogers, After Prometheus, are Human Genes Patentable Subject Matter?, 11 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 434, 451 n.92 (2013) (commenting that the law of nature and natural phenomena
exceptions are "fully consistent" with the statutory requirement of newness, but the abstract idea
exception may not be).
99. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
100. Id. at 2117 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 305 n.1, 310 (1980)).
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'new ... composition[s] of matter,' that are patent eligible." 10 1 cDNA
was distinguished as "unquestionably ... new," and therefore possibly
patent eligible:
[Tihe lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA
retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from
which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a "product of nature" and is patent
eligible under § 101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening
introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may
be indistinguishable from natural DNA.1
0 2
Section 101's "newness" requirement, as articulated in Myriad,
is squishy. The Court conceded that isolating DNA "technically
creates new molecules with unique chemical compositions,"'1 3 but this
was not enough to confer patent eligibility on Myriad's claims.
"Unquestionable" newness is sufficient; "technical" newness is not.
Unlike the novelty inquiry under § 102, a "newness" analysis
under § 101 does not turn on details such as who published or sold
what, when, and where. This flexibility permits a conclusion that
certain portions of an invention are "routine" or "conventional"
without elaborate discussion of the matter, or citation to pertinent
prior art. In his Diehr dissent, Justice Stevens explained the
distinction as follows:
[T]he character of the subject matter that the inventor claims to be novel [is the § 101
issue] and the question whether that subject matter is in fact novel [is] the § 102
issue.
10 4
Later in the dissent, he elaborated:
If there is not even a claim that anything constituting patentable subject matter has
been discovered, there is no occasion to address the novelty issue. Or, as was true in
Flook, if the only concept that the inventor claims to have discovered is not patentable
subject matter, § 101 requires that the application be rejected without reaching any
issue under § 102; for it is irrelevant that unpatentable subject matter-in that case a
formula for updating alarm limits-may in fact be novel. 
10 5
This mode of analysis is consistent with the Court's present
inclination to require "an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [implicit exception] itself.'01 6 A patent that discloses nothing
"new" beyond one of the implicit exceptions is not a "new" invention or
discovery under § 101 (or so the argument goes). But, as already
101. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
102. Id. at 2119.
103. Id. at 2115 (citing Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent &
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1328 (2012)).
104. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 194 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)
(quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)).
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discussed, the text of § 101 does not compel this result, which is
premised on the idea that the implicit exceptions themselves cannot
be "new." That premise is doubtful, at least with respect to the
abstract idea exception. The statutory text would appear to
accommodate an invention based on a "new" idea implemented in an
otherwise conventional manner.
D. Natural Rights Theory
Today, the primary justification for patents is utilitarian;
society (through Congress) grants limited monopoly rights to
incentivize innovation and corresponding disclosure, from which the
next generation of advances springs. 10 7 Sir Isaac Newton got the idea:
"If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."
108
The utilitarian justification for patents is most often attributed to
Thomas Jefferson.10 9 It is recognized in the Intellectual Property
Clause of our Constitution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."'110
There is an alternative to this utilitarian view of patents, a
belief that an inventor has a "natural right" to the "product of her
mind."11 On this view, "it is right for a person, and only that person,
to exploit the values that she creates."11 2  The creator cannot be
separated from her creation.11 3 Society may recognize the property
107. See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 962 (2007)
(commenting that Thomas Jefferson "forcefully advanced the utilitarian and economic
justification of the patent system-the primary justification for patents today").
108. Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1676), as transcribed in JEAN-
PIERRE MAURY, NEWTON: UNDERSTANDING THE COSMOS: NEW HORIZONS (1992).
109. See Mossoff, supra note 107, at 959-67 (explaining the now well-accepted
"Jeffersonian Story of Patent Law"); see also Eric Maughan, Note, Protecting the Rights of
Inventors: How Natural Rights Theory Should Influence the Injunction Analysis in Patent
Infringement Cases, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 215, 230 (2012) (noting that Jefferson's writings
are generally cited "as evidence that utilitarianism is the enshrined American patent theory").
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
111. Maughan, supra note 109, at 229-34 (discussing natural rights theory of intellectual
property); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L.
REV. 65 (1997) ("Rights to control intellectual works are not ultimately based solely on grounds
of social utility.").
112. Maughan, supra note 109, at 233.
113. See Chidi Oguamanam, Beyond Theories: Intellectual Property Dynamics in the
Global Knowledge Economy, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 104, 108 (2009) ("[T]he crux of
natural rights thinking is that creators' or inventors' entitlement to their work is akin to an
inherent natural right which the state is under an obligation to protect and enforce .... [T]he
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right, but the "natural rights theory holds that the rights exist
independent of any grant."'1 14 The natural rights theory of intellectual
property is associated with James Madison, 115 and although it has
fallen out of favor, it was "relied upon by many early American
courts."11
6
The belief that intellectual property is a natural right is a twist
on John Locke's theory that one acquires a property interest in a
material object by laboring on it:
It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this
labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a
right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in
common for others. 
11 7
Locke's theory can be adapted to explain intellectual property rights
by recognizing that creation through intellectual labor can be as
personal, and valuable, as might modification through physical
labor.118 Note, however, that Locke stated an important caveat: an
individual's claim to exclusive rights should leave "enough, and as
good, ... in common for others."11 9
The Court's patent-eligibility jurisprudence took on a natural
rights flavor from the beginning. In Le Roy, the Court stated that
certain things-"a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive"-"cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an
exclusive right. '' 12° The same with "any... power in nature," such as
theory builds upon the primacy of personhood which promotes the notion of the inseparability of
the creator from her creation.").
114. Maughan, supra note 109, at 233.
115. See id. at 231; Mosoff, supra note 107, at 977-85. But see Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
873, 901 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that both Jefferson and Madison "embraced" a
"utilitarian view of copyrights and patents").
116. Maughan, supra note 109, at 231 & n.92 (collecting cases); cf. Andrew M.
Hetherington, Constitutional Purpose and Inter-Clause Conflict: The Constraints Imposed on
Congress by the Copyright Clause, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 457, 468 (2003) (noting
that both "theoretical justifications for intellectual property rights"-the natural rights theory
and the instrumentalist theory-were floating around at the time of the Founding).
117. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, § 27 (1690).
118. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral Justification of Legal
Protection of Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2012) (commenting that
Locke's views on intellectual property are unknown, but that his labor mixing theory "would
have to be modified in some significant way to apply to... intellectual objects"); Maughan, supra
note 109, at 232 n.98 (noting that a natural rights-based theory of intellectual property "differs
slightly from the usual interpretation of Locke, in that the focus is on creation of value
(production), rather than merely one form of creating value (physical labor)").
119. LOCKE, supra note 117, at ch. 5, § 27; see Himma, supra note 118, at 1136 ("[Ilf it
makes sense to think that there is enough left for others in the 'intellectual commons' or if there
is nothing that would count as an intellectual commons at all, then the argument for intellectual
property protection seems that much stronger.").
120. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
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electricity, "which is alike open to all."121 A property right arises only
upon human intervention-"the processes used to extract, modify, and
concentrate natural agencies," to "apply[] them to useful objects."
122
Later cases continued to stress the natural rights ideals that a
genuine human contribution ("labor," in the words of Locke) is
necessary to create exclusive rights, and that such rights must leave
"enough" in the public domain (Locke's "commons"). In Funk Brothers
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court held that a plant inoculant
made from a particularly effective mixture of bacteria was not patent
eligible, for
[t]he qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. . . . If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end.
12 3
The Court in Chakrabarty relied on Funk Brothers's "free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none" language in explaining the limits of
§ 101:
[A] new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
E=mc
2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
1 2 4
The Funk Brothers passage was repeated in Diehr,125 Bilski,
126
Prometheus,127 and Myriad. 12
8
In the latter three cases, the Court's concern that certain
patents may take too much from the public domain is evident. In
Bilski, the Court stated that "[a]llowing petitioners to patent risk
hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and would
effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea." 129 In Prometheus,
the Court stated the "basic underlying concern that [the asserted]
patents tie up too much future use of laws of nature."'
30 Most
recently, in Myriad, the Court began by observing that Myriad's
assertions of infringement "solidified its position as the only entity
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (citing Telephone Cases,
126 U.S. 1, 532-33 (1888); De Forest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664, 684-85
(193 1); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Cameron Septic Tank Co.
v. Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1908)).
124. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
125. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
126. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
127. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
128. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013).
129. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231.
130. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302.
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providing BRCA testing."131  The Court explained that the implicit
exceptions to § 101 were needed to avoid the "considerable danger that
the grant of patents would 'tie up' the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work."132 Flook had previously acknowledged a similar
interest in preserving the intellectual commons, stating that "the
public must not be deprived of any rights that it theretofore freely
enjoyed." 1
33
As discussed below, the preemption concern can be understood
on a utilitarian basis. If we allow people to take (in the form of
exclusive property rights) more than they give (their inventive
contributions, as disclosed to the world), innovation may slow rather
than grow. The natural rights rubric, however, provides a similar
critique of excessive preemption. Preempting too much is the same as
failing to leave "enough, and as good" for others, a violation of one of
Locke's central tenets.
The problem with this position is that the Court has rejected a
natural law justification for our patent system. In Graham v. John
Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court stated that the patent power is a
"qualified authority," which "is limited to the promotion of advances in
the 'useful arts."' 134 The Court dubbed Jefferson the "moving spirit"
behind our patent system and noted his rejection of intellectual
property as a natural right:
[Jefferson] rejected a natural-rights theory in intellectual property rights and clearly
recognized the social and economic rationale of the patent system. The patent monopoly
Was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an exclusive
right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature
of disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given. 
13 5
The Court in Golan v. Holder, a case concerning legislation that
extended copyright to certain works previously in the public domain,
expressed skepticism that the "public domain [is] a category of
constitutional significance." 136 Thus, while the implicit exceptions
may have a basis in natural rights theory, the Court has never said so.
131. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2114.
132. Id. at 2116 (quoting Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1301).
133. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (quoting P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS, § 4, p. 13 (1975)).
134. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
135. Id. at 8-9; see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 902 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (observing that a "utilitarian understanding of the Copyright Clause has long been
reflected in the Court's case law," and collecting cases).
136. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884-88 & 88 n.26 (2012).
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E. Purposive Interpretation
One of the longstanding statutory interpretation debates
concerns just how far a court may go in conforming (or bending, or
construing, or reconciling) Congress's words to achieve the perceived
purpose of the law. Must the literal text yield to the statutory
objective, or vice versa? The Court's Holy Trinity Church opinion
provides the classic statement that purpose must prevail: "It is a
familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the
intention of its makers."13 7 Contemporary versions tend to be more
respectful of the statutory text, while still stressing the importance of
interpreting the law in light of its purpose. The Court's statement in
Dolan v. United States Postal Service is exemplary: "Interpretation of
a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text,
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any
precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.
138
Critics of this approach see over-reliance on statutory purpose
as a usurpation of the legislative role. The courts are to interpret
what Congress actually did, not decide what Congress should have
done. Justice Scalia, speaking for the Court in Great-West Life &
Annuity Insurance Company v. Knudson, expressed the sentiment: "It
is... not our job to find reasons for what Congress has plainly done;
and it is our job to avoid rendering what Congress has plainly done...
devoid of reason and effect."'139 Justice Thomas reiterated the point in
Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. that
courts should not substitute their "policy" views "for the legislation
which has been passed by Congress." 140 Under this approach, "vague
notions" of the "basic purpose" of a statute cannot "overcome the words
of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration."
' 141
The Court has said that the implicit exceptions to § 101 may
further the basic purpose of the patent system, namely to promote
innovation. In Le Roy, the Court warned that patenting "[a] principle,
137. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S 457, 459 (1892).
138. Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); see also Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979) ("As in all cases of statutory construction,
our task is to interpret the words of thef statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve."); Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (noting that a statute
need not be given its "usual meaning" if doing so would "thwart" the law's "obvious purpose").
139. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217-18 (2002).
140. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008) (quoting
In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 256 (2003)).
141. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (citing Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1990)).
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in the abstract," or a "power in nature" would "discourage" innovation,
thereby frustrating the "avowed policy of the patent laws."142
The Bilski concurrences likewise relied on the statute's
utilitarian purpose to explain the implicit exceptions. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, stated that
patenting 'laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas'.. .would stifle the very progress that Congress is authorized to
promote."143 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, opined that the
"underlying policy of the patent system" (i.e., that the public good
must outweigh "the restrictive effect of the limited patent monopoly")
serves as a limit to § 101's "broad" text.144
This policy rationale was adopted by the Court in Prometheus
and Myriad. In Prometheus, the unanimous Court equated the
implicit exceptions to 'the basic tools of scientific and technological
work,"' monopolization of which "might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it."145 Myriad reiterated that, by
recognizing implicit exceptions to § 101, the Court avoided the
"'considerable danger"' that patents might 'tie up"' too much and
'inhibit further innovation,"' which would be contrary to "the very
point of patents, which exist to promote creation."1 46
The Court's purpose-based interpretation of § 101 is
noteworthy in several respects. In searching for congressional
purpose, courts typically rely, at least somewhat, on the words of the
statute to guide the way. It has often been said that there is "no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes,"147
and that "no legislation pursues its purposes at all costs." 148 Yet the
text of § 101 is little discussed in the Court's opinions. It is unclear,
for example, how Congress's inclusion of "any new and useful process"
in § 101 suggests exclusion of Bilski's claimed method for risk hedging
142. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
143. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)) (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113
(1853)).
144. Id. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas
City, 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966)).
145. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
146. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013) (quoting Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1289, 1301) (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 309 (1980)).
147. See, e.g., Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United
States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
148. See Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987).
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in energy markets (which is certainly "useful" and is "new" so long as
no one had come up with it before).
1 49
Courts may use statutory purpose to resolve ambiguities in the
text, but "[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous... 'judicial
inquiry is complete."' 150  The Court has not held that § 101 is
ambiguous; to the contrary. In Chakrabarty, that Court stated:
[M]e perceive no ambiguity [in § 1011. The subject-matter provisions of the patent law
have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of
promoting "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" with all that means for the
social and economic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general language is not
necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad terms.1
5 1
The clarity of § 101's text seems to work against the creation of
implicit statutory exceptions. And, even if § 101 was somewhat
ambiguous-is a natural law or a fundamental principle "new"? Is a
method of doing business a "process"?-it would be odd to solve that
perceived ambiguity by adding an additional layer of uncertainty to
the statute's scope. For example, how much more than an "abstract
idea" is "enough" to satisfy § 101?
Given the straightforward language of § 101, what accounts for
the implicit exceptions to the statute? Recall that the "implicit
exception" label showed-up for the first time in the § 101 context in
Prometheus.152  Justice Breyer wrote Prometheus, and his past
opinions reveal a willingness to find statutory exceptions when
necessary to achieve the purpose of the law.
In F.C.C. v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., Justice
Breyer dissented from the Court's interpretation of a bankruptcy
statute.' 53 Justice Breyer took the majority to task for "rely[ing]
exclusively upon the literal meaning of [the] statute's words divorced
from consideration of the statute's purpose.' 1 54 He explained that
"[flaw is tied to life" and should not be interpreted to "undermine the
very human activity that the law seeks to benefit.' ' 55 In Justice
Breyer's view, "[g]eneral terms as used on particular occasions often
149. Cf. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 ("Any suggestion in this Court's case law that the
Patent Act's terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an explanation for the
exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas." (citing Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978))).
150. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. United
States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
151. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
152. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1289
(2012).
153. See FCC v. NextWave Personal Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 310-11 (2003) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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carry with them implied restrictions" so as to avoid consequences
which are "at odds with the statute's basic objectives."
15 6
This explains Justice Breyer's view of patent eligibility, which
he articulated in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite
Laboratories, Inc.157 LabCorp was Prometheus before Prometheus.
The patent at issue was to "a process for helping to diagnose
deficiencies of two vitamins, folate and cobalamin. 158 The diagnostic
test was based on the correlation between the level of a particular
amino acid in the body and vitamin deficiency.1 59 The Court granted
certiorari to decide the following question:
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and non-enabling
step directing a party simply to "correlate" test results can validly claim a monopoly
over a basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor
necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship after looking
at a test result.
1 60
The Court later dismissed the petition as improvidently
granted, over Justice Breyer's dissent. The dissent argued that the
patent was invalid under the "natural phenomenon" doctrine, and it
wasn't even close.1 61 The unpatentability of "fundamental scientific
principles" and "manifestations of laws of nature" was justified as
consistent with promoting innovation. Such exclusions "reflect[] a
basic judgment that protection in such cases, despite its potentially
positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or
discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge
itself."162  Interestingly, Justice Breyer's opinion suggests that the
Court in 2006 had not yet settled on a home for the implicit
exceptions, stating that "the 'law of nature' principle most comfortably
fits" in § 101 of the Patent Act. 163 That a statutory exception can exist
in the abstract, untethered to any particular provision of the law,
156. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
157. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
158. Id. at 125 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
159. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
160. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005) (granting
certiorari on question three of the petition), order vacated on reconsideration by Lab. Corp. of
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999 (2005).
161. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 135 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) ("[T]his case is not at the boundary. It
does not require us to consider the precise scope of the 'natural phenomenon' doctrine or any
other difficulty issue. In my view, [the claim] is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably
interprets that doctrine.").
162. Id. at 128 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
163. See id. at 132 (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 101; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588-89 (1978)).
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further illustrates the purposive approach to defining patent
eligibility.
As discussed above, Prometheus is similarly reasoned. This is
not surprising, given Justice Breyer's authorship. What is surprising,
at least at first glance, is that the entire Court signed-on to an opinion
that so plainly exalts the purpose of the law over the words of the
statute. And then the entire Court ratified the Prometheus approach
in Myriad, an opinion penned by Justice Thomas. How does the
purpose-first methodology of Prometheus square with the idea that
"courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there"?164 Why doesn't
"any new and useful process" mean any new and useful process? 165
The key, I think, derives from the source of the patent power.
The purpose of patents-to promote innovation-is no ordinary
legislative purpose. It resides in the Constitution, not the
congressional record. Thus, the patent eligibility question has a
constitutional dimension, as articulated by Justice Breyer in his
LabCorp dissent:
The justification for the [implicit exceptions] does not lie in any claim that "laws of
nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful....
Rather, the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can
impede rather than "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the constitutional
objective of patent and copyright protection. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.166
When the Constitution is involved, statutory interpretation changes.
Here, it changes in a way that might explain the Court's unanimous
acceptance of the implicit exceptions.
F The Constitutional Avoidance Twist
Courts interpret statutes so that they do not conflict with the
Constitution. This is called the constitutional avoidance canon. An
oft-cited formulation is stated in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr:
[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional
problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is "fairly possible,"
[courts] are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems. 167
164. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citing United States v.
Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989); United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95,
102-03 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68 (1810)).
165. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Cf. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 218-19
(2008) (interpreting the statutory term "any" as "broad" and "expansive").
166. Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 126-27.
167. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 65 (1932)) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341,
345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
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The canon has been justified by assuming that Congress would not
have intended to pass unconstitutional laws. As stated in Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades
Council, "[t]his approach ... recognizes that Congress, like this Court,
is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts
will therefore not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe
constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally
forbidden it."168 Another argument for constitutional avoidance is its
longevity. It "has for so long been applied by th[e] Court that it is
beyond debate."
169
The constitutional provision that has shaped the Court's patent
eligibility jurisprudence is, not surprisingly, the Intellectual Property
Clause. The Court's § 101 opinions, particularly the recent ones,
reflect a belief that the implicit exceptions may be needed "to promote
the progress of ... useful Arts." In Myriad, the Court stated that
patents on laws of nature or abstract ideas would pose "considerable
danger" to "future innovation," which would be "at odds with the very
point of patents, which exist to promote creation."' 70  The Myriad
Court also referenced the "delicate balance" struck by patent law, a
desire to locate the tipping point at which exclusive rights hinder
innovation rather than help.' 71 The Intellectual Property Clause was
not cited, but its influence is apparent.
In Prometheus, the Court stated that patenting "basic tools of
scientific and technological work ... might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it."172 As in Myriad, the Court's
concern with promoting progress calls the Intellectual Property Clause
168. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citing Grenada Co. Supervisors v. Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269 (1884));
see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 697 (1984) ("[T]he [constitutional avoidance] maxim..
• reflects a judicial presumption concerning the intent of the draftsmen of the language in
question. In areas where legislation might intrude on constitutional guarantees, we believe that
Congress, which also has sworn to protect the Constitution, would intend to err on the side of
fundamental constitutional liberties when its legislation implicates those liberties.").
169. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575 (citations omitted); see also Richard L.
Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SuP. CT. REV.
181, 186-87 (noting additional justifications for the avoidance canon, including as "a low salience
mechanism for giving effect to . . . 'underenforced constitutional norms" and as a mechanism to
help '"courts conserve their institutional capital"' (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P.
Frickey & Elizabeth Garret, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy 918 (West, 4th ed. 2007))).
170. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(citations omitted).
171. Id.
172. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 16:2:353
IMPLICIT EXCEPTIONS TO § 101
to mind, although it was not mentioned explicitly.' 73 Later on, the
Court reiterated the "risk" that "tying up" natural laws could "inhibit
their use in the making of further discoveries."
' 174
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Bilski expressed similar
sentiments, but unlike Prometheus and Myriad, Justice Stevens
expressly noted the constitutional aspect:
The Court has kept this "constitutional standard" in mind when deciding what is
patentable subject matter under § 101. For example, we have held that no one can
patent "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." These "are the basic
tools of scientific and technological work," and therefore, if patented, would stifle the
very progress that Congress is authorized to promote. 
17 5
The concurrence saw ambiguity in § 101, such that the statute could
be interpreted to achieve a "careful balance" between patents that
promote innovation and those that do not.' 76 Business method patents
fell on the wrong side of the line.
Since the constitutional concern is so evident, why has the
Court not called upon the avoidance canon to justify the implicit
exceptions, despite the opportunity to do so? The constitutional
question was presented in Myriad. In its petition for certiorari, the
Association for Molecular Pathology argued that patents on isolated
DNA are invalid under the Constitution, since "[t]he rationale for
granting a patent - the need to create economic incentives to advance
science - did not apply in this case. '177 In Prometheus, LabCorp as
amicus argued that "patents on measurements of nature" lack
"originality," which "raises serious questions under" the Intellectual
Property Clause that should be avoided if possible. 178 Yet, the Court's
recent opinions in both Prometheus and Myriad use the language of
the Constitution (to "promote" innovation) without actually citing the
document. There are several reasons why the Court might hesitate to
openly constitutionalize the issue of patent eligibility.
173. Compare U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ('To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."), with Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 ("[G]rant of a patent
might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.").
174. Id. at 1294.
175. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (citing
O'Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853)).
176. See id. at 3252.
177. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2012 WL 4502947, at *26.
178. Brief for ARUP Labs., Inc. & Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 20-21, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 4071919, at *20-21.
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First, the avoidance canon applies when the constitutional
interpretation of the statute "is fairly possible."179  It "has no
application in the absence of statutory ambiguity."180  As discussed
above, Justice Stevens, concurring in Bilski, found § 101 ambiguous.181
But the Court has never rejected Chakrabarty's position that the
statute is broad but not ambiguous.18 2 The Court has not explained
how the text of § 101 may bear a reading that excludes all things
which do not, in the eyes of the judiciary, amount to "significantly
more" than an "abstract idea" or "law of nature." Because the Court
has yet to undertake an "ordinary textual analysis" of § 101 to
demonstrate that the statute is "susceptible of more than one
construction," the canon of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable, at
least in its traditional sense.
18 3
Even presuming ambiguity in § 101, the canon is generally
used to avoid "serious constitutional problems"18 4  and "serious
doubt[s] of constitutionality."'1 8 5 It is, at best, an educated guess that
implicit exceptions to § 101 are necessary to "promote the progress
of ... useful arts," i.e., to avoid a potential conflict with the
Intellectual Property Clause. The Court has acknowledged as much
through the soft language used to describe the consequences of an
exception-less § 101. The Prometheus Court stated that an overly
inclusive view of patent eligibility "might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it."186 A broad § 101 would "risk"
inhibiting further discoveries.18 7  Myriad uses slightly stronger
179. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001).
180. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 494 (2001); see also
Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 154 (2007) ("[Tjhe canon of constitutional avoidance does not
apply if a statute is not 'genuinely susceptible to two constructions."' (quoting Alamendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998))); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464
(1991) ("The canon of construction that a court should strive to interpret a statute in a way that
will avoid an unconstitutional construction is useful in close cases, but it is 'not a license for the
judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature."' (quoting United States v. Monsanto,
491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989))).
181. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3252 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
183. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1998); United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909)).
184. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299-300 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
185. United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (citing
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
186. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012).
187. Id. at 1294.
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language-"considerable danger"188-but it still falls short of
proclaiming grave or "serious" constitutional doubts.
Whether or not the substantive criteria of patentability set
forth in § 102 (novelty), § 103 (nonobviousness), and § 112
(enablement and adequate written description) are capable of
screening out enough "bad" patents such that the patent system, as a
whole, could promote innovation consistent with the Intellectual
Property Clause would seem to be unknowable,18 9 or at least beyond
the purview of the judiciary.190 When a statute might (or might not)
conflict with the Constitution, the avoidance canon need not be
applied. As the Court said in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the
absence of an "obvious answer" to the constitutional question is crucial
in determining the canon's applicability (or lack thereof):
[Tihe "constitutional doubt" doctrine does not apply mechanically whenever there arises
a significant constitutional question the answer to which is not obvious. And precedent
makes clear that the Court need not apply (for it has not always applied) the doctrine in
circumstances ... where a constitutional question, while lacking an obvious answer,
does not lead a majority gravely to doubt that the statute is constitutional. 19 1
Without an "obvious answer," Congress's policy judgment usually
prevails, as it did in Golan v. Holder.
192
In Golan, the Court held that the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA), which had the effect of removing certain works from the
public domain, did not violate the Intellectual Property Clause. 193 The
Court stressed that Congress has discretion to craft an 'intellectual
188. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013).
189. Cf. Vincent Y. Ling, Patently Ours? Constitutional Challenges to Gene Patents, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 813, 832-34 (2012) (surveying studies and concluding that "the net effect of
upstream patents on research is far from clear").
190. Cf. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 ("[O]ur cases have not distinguished among
different laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently
narrow. And this is understandable. Courts and judges are not institutionally well suited to
making the kinds of judgments needed to distinguish among different laws of nature." (citation
omitted)); Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision
of "Progress", 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1246 (2013) (opining that the
otherwise flawless Prometheus opinion "fails to clearly articulate a connection between the
constitutional limitation 'to promote progress' and how the limitation necessitates the 'bright-
line' law of nature exclusion and restores balance to evaluating the law of nature exclusion and
Section 101 as the threshold test for patentability" (quoting Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of
Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promise Land: Bilski's Superficial Textualism
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1289, 1307-08 (2011))).
191. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991); id. at 204-07 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v.
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989); id. at 636 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v.
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985); id. at 120 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
192. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
193. See id. at 889.
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property regime[] that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the
ends of the Clause."' 194  This echoes the Court's statement in
Chakrabarty, that it is for Congress, not the courts, to define
patentable subject matter; Congress has done so in "broad terms to
fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting 'the Progress
of Science and the useful Arts."' 195
Judging the constitutionality of intellectual property statutes,
§ 101 included, is further complicated by the uncertain import of the
Intellectual Property Clause. It could be seen as a broad "restraint on
Congress's authority to enact intellectual-property laws," such that
Congress cannot legislate in this area unless the laws "in actuality,
promote ... progress." 196 This raises the question of how "progress"
could or should be measured, and how Congress, ex ante, could
possibly know the answer to that question.
The Intellectual Property Clause could also mean that "if
Congress desires to promote the progress of science and useful arts, it
may do so only by awarding to authors and inventors the exclusive
right in their writings and discoveries for limited times."1 97 In other
words, patents and copyrights are the whole ballgame. However, this
view might leave Congress free to pass intellectual property-like laws
to achieve other objectives.
Alternatively, the Intellectual Property Clause could be read as
entirely unrelated to Congress's other enumerated powers. Under this
view, patents could be justified under, say, the Commerce Clause.1 98
Proponents of this interpretation believe that "Congress, as a matter
of policy, ought to decide the Intellectual Property Clause's boundaries
vis-h-vis Congress's other powers."1 99
A discussion of the relative merit of these interpretations is
beyond the scope of this Article; suffice it to say that the question is
open.200 Consider, for example, the Court's declaration in Graham
that the Intellectual Property Clause is "both a grant of power and a
limitation."201 A limitation on what? The Court stated that "Congress
in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints
194. Id. at 888 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003)).
195. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980).
196. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause's External Limitations, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1329, 1336 (2012) (attributing such a view to Justice Breyer, among others).
197. See id. at 1337 (arguing for this approach).
198. Fromer, supra note 196, at 1337-38 (referencing the work of Professor Thomas
Nachbar).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1359-65 (arguing that while "[tihe Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
IP Clause's external limitations directly," the great weight of precedent is consistent with the
view of the IP Clause as a limitation on Congress's other powers).
201. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
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imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. ' 20 2 This says nothing
about whether Congress can avoid the "limitation" in the Intellectual
Property Clause by relying on its other powers.
The issue arose again in Eldred v. Ashcroft, in which the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA) over petitioners' arguments that legislation extending existing
copyrights "categorically failed] to 'promote the Progress of
Science."' 20 3  The petitioners did not argue that the "[Intellectual
Property] Clause's preamble is an independently enforceable limit on
Congress' power," but rather that it "identifies the sole end to which
Congress may legislate."20 4 Citing Graham, the Court agreed that, "to
the extent [Congress] enacts copyright laws at all," it must "create a
system that promotes the Progress of Science."205  But, the Court
cautioned that "it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide
how to best pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives."
20 6
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that while the Copyright
Clause "grants broad legislative power to Congress," the CTEA
exceeded constitutional limits because "its practical effect is not to
promote, but to inhibit, the progress of Science." 20 7  As discussed
above, Justice Breyer's § 101 opinions express the same concern. Also
dissenting in Eldred, Justice Stevens worried that the majority's
reading of the Constitution "provide[s] essentially no limit on
congressional action under the Clause."208 The Court divided again in
Golan, with the majority taking an expansive view of what it means to
promote progress, and Justice Breyer in dissent arguing that a law
"withdraw[ing] works from the public domain" without "providing any
additional incentive for the production of new material" exceeds "any
plausible reading of the Copyright Clause."
20 9
The question of how, and how much, the Intellectual Property
Clause restricts congressional power is complicated and potentially
divisive, as seen in Eldred and Golan. The Court's interpretive
methodology in Prometheus and Myriad-alluding to the Constitution,
202. Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).
203. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 211-12, 218 (2003).
204. Id. at 211.
205. Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Graham v.
John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1966)).
206. Id. at 212-13 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); Sony Corp. of Am.
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Graham, 383 U.S. at 6).
207. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 903 (2012) (Breyer, J., joined by Alito, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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without expressly relying on it-avoids the question.210  This
less-direct approach has won over the entire Court. 211
The Court's adoption, without dissent, of the position that
§ 101 contains implicit exceptions may be best understood as an
aggressive form of constitutional avoidance, wherein an interpretation
that "might tend" to raise a constitutional problem is eschewed even if
the chosen construction is far less consistent with the statutory text.
212
Prometheus's portrayal of the implicit exceptions as a solution to a
potential constitutional problem, instead of a mere manifestation of
congressional intent or purpose, has apparently fallen on sympathetic
ears.213 This is not all that surprising; when a constitutional question
is implicated, statutory text is more flexible.
Consider 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, in which the Court held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not bar
the mandatory arbitration provision in a union's collective bargaining
agreement. 21 4 Speaking for the Court, Justice Thomas stated that a
"judicial policy concern" is no basis "for introducing a qualification into
210. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305
(2012); Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), affd
in part and rev'd in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). The district court
in Myriad applied a related, but distinct, principle of constitutional avoidance. 702 F. Supp. 2d at
238. The court held that Myriad's patents were "directed to a law of nature and were therefore
improperly granted." Id. at 237. Because that holding gave the plaintiffs the relief they sought,
the court declined to decide whether the "USPTO's policy permitting the grant of the Myriad
patents violates Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 and the First Amendment of the Constitution," and
dismissed the constitutional claims. Id. at 238. In other words, the district court's reliance on the
avoidance canon was predicated on the validity and applicability of the law of nature exception;
constitutional avoidance was not used to justify the exception in the first place, which is what
this Article proposes. See id.
211. See, e.g., Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1305; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO,
702 F. Supp. 2d at 238. An intermediate approach might also be available. One could argue that
even if § 101 (without the implicit exceptions) would hypothetically be justifiable under the
Commerce Clause, Congress in actuality relied on the Intellectual Property Clause for legislative
authority and so must be bound by its restrictions. See S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 3 (1952) ("[P]atent
laws are enacted by Congress in accordance with the power granted by article 1, section 8, of the
Constitution.").
212. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 Sup. CT. REV. 181 (discussing the Roberts' Court's occasionally enthusiastic
application of the constitutional avoidance canon). Hasen criticizes the Court's reliance on the
avoidance doctrine in Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193
(2009), commenting that "the Court adopted an implausible interpretation of the statute. Indeed,
the Court's statutory interpretation analysis was so weak that the Court failed even to respond
to the contrary statutory points raised by the government and offered in detail by the. district
court." Hasen, supra.
213. See, e.g., Prometheus, 133 S. Ct. at 2116. NAMUDNO-like the Court's recent § 101
decisions-was unanimous in relevant part. Hasen, supra note 212, at 206. Hasen finds it "most
remarkable" that the Court, without dissent, employed the avoidance canon to achieve a
statutory interpretation that "mangled Congress's statutory intent." Id. at 206.
214. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 255 (2009).
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the ADEA that is not found in its text."215 However, Justice Thomas
implied a caveat: a "constitutional barrier" may suffice to read
policy-related implicit exceptions into a statute.216 Justice Thomas's
opinion for the Court in Myriad suggests that the Court may see a
"constitutional barrier" to reading § 101 too broadly.217
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co. reveals a similar willingness to depart from a literal reading of a
statute to avoid a "perhaps unconstitutional[] result."218  The Bock
Laundry case required the Court to interpret Federal Rule of Evidence
609(a), which at the time ordered that certain evidence "shall be
admitted... only if... the court determines that the probative value
of admitting th[e] evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant."219 This clause, if interpreted literally, would give "civil
defendants but not civil plaintiffs ... the benefit of weighing
prejudice." 220  Justice Scalia agreed with the Court that such a
construction could not be correct, for a literal interpretation of
"defendant" would be "absurd," "unthinkable," "bizarre," and "perhaps
unconstitutional."221 The implicit exceptions might reflect a view that
patents on abstract ideas and products of nature are "perhaps
unconstitutional," because they could impede progress rather than
promote it.
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion in National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius is also instructive. In NFIB,
the Chief Justice relied on the avoidance canon to uphold the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) individual
mandate as a legitimate exercise of Congress's taxing power.
222
Although Congress referred to the consequences of failing to purchase
health insurance as a "penalty," not a "tax," this was not dispositive.
223
The Chief Justice acknowledged that the "most straightforward
reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase
215. Id. at 270.
216. Id. ("Absent a constitutional barrier, 'it is not for us to substitute our view of ...
policy for the legislation which has been passed by Congress."' (quoting Fla. Dept. of Revenue v.
Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 50 (2008))).
217. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)
(noting "considerable danger" that patents on laws of nature or abstract ideas would not
"promote creation," and would therefore be "at odds with the very point of patents" (citations
omitted)).
218. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 509 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)).
220. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
222. National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2597-2600 (2012).
223. Id. at 2594.
2014] 389
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
insurance," but read the mandate as a tax anyway. 224 He explained
that 'every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality,"' and that it was "fairly
possible" to read the mandate as a tax.225 Four dissenters disagreed,
arguing that interpreting the mandate as a tax would 'do[] violence to
the fair meaning of the words used."' 226 Courts "cannot rewrite the
statute to be what it is not" under the guise of constitutional
avoidance.
227
An aggressive use of constitutional avoidance, such as that
applied by the Chief Justice in the ACA case, or suggested by Justices
Thomas and Scalia in 14 Penn Plaza and Bock Laundry, respectively,
could explain the Court's unanimous endorsement of the implicit
exceptions to § 101. One scholar has said that the Chief Justice "has
shown an occasional fondness for creative statutory interpretations
that avoid constitutional invalidation of prominent legislation, even at
the cost of some contortion of the text," and that "his fellow Justices
often have been happy to go along."228 If § 101 might possibly be read
to include the exceptions, and the Court sees a potential constitutional
problem with doing otherwise, the avoidance canon may come into
play.
Professor Richard Hasen has proposed three explanations for
the Roberts Court's sometimes-aggressive application of constitutional
avoidance to massage seemingly plain statutory text: the "fruitful
dialogue" explanation; the "political legitimacy" explanation; and the
"political calculus" explanation. 229 The first posits that the Court will
avoid a constitutional question and "remand" the issue to Congress
when there is a "realistic chance" of a legislative fix. 230 The second
posits that the Court uses the constitutional avoidance doctrine when
it "fears that a fullblown constitutional pronouncement would harm
its legitimacy."23 1 The third and least charitable explanation posits
that the Court uses constitutional avoidance "to soften public and
224. Id. at 2593.
225. Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)) (citing Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). But see United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591-92
(2010) (holding avoidance canon permits reinterpretation, not rewriting, of a statute, and then
only when the statute is "readily susceptible" to the chosen interpretation).
226. Id. at 2651 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Grenada Co. Supervisors v.
Brogden, 112 U.S. 261, 269 (1884)).
227. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
228. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 92 (2012)
(critiquing National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2597-2600
(2012)).
229. Hasen, supra note 212, at 183-84.
230. Id. at 183.
231. Id.
[Vol. 16:2:353390
IMPLICIT EXCEPTIONS TO § 101
Congressional resistance to the Court's movement of the law in a
direction that the Court prefers as a matter of policy."
232
Hasen's three theories all have some appeal in the § 101
context. Congress has shown a willingness to reform the patent
system when perceived problems arise, as in the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act of 2011.233 Of course, if Congress sees the Court
as fixing the problem of "bad patents" on its own, legislation may be
viewed as unnecessary.
234
As to the "political legitimacy" rationale, a "fullblown...
pronouncement" that § 101 is so broad as to be unconstitutional may
be problematic. 235 It could require the Court to interpret the preamble
of the Intellectual Property Clause as a significant restriction on
Congress's power, which would likely meet resistance in the legislative
branch. The Court was unwilling to take this step in Eldred and
Golan. Additionally, if § 101 is struck down (and assuming it is
severable from the rest of the patent statute), our patent laws would
be left without any restriction on patent eligible subject matter.
Anything at all new, non-obvious, and well-described would be entitled
to patent protection. This may exacerbate the problem of "bad"
patents, which has attracted significant public attention.236
Finally, as to the "political calculus" explanation, the idea that
patents are not necessary to spur innovation is in vogue. In his recent
article in The Atlantic entitled "Why There Are Too Many Patents in
America," Judge Richard Posner proposes that "[m]ost industries
232. Id. at 183-84.
233. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see also Press Release, The White House,
President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate
Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/president-obama-
signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim (touting the ALA as "historic patent
reform legislation that will help American entrepreneurs and businesses bring their inventions
to market sooner, creating new businesses and new jobs").
234. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM PATENT ACADEMY: PATENTS ON COMPUTER-
IMPLEMENTED METHODS AND SYSTEMS: THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS REVIEW (CLS BANK)
BACKGROUND DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTS (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://www.chisum-
patent-academy.com/wp-content/uploads/Supreme-Court-on-Computer-Software-Patents- 1.pdf.
Professor Chisum recently opined that Congress, in the AIA, "tossed away the 'hot potato' of
interpreting Section 101 patent eligibility in the context of software." Id. at 58. According to
Professor Chisum, this "Congressional abdication" obliges the Supreme Court to address the
issue. Id.
235. See Hasen, supra note 212, at 183.
236. See, e.g., Joshua Brustein, Fixing America's Patent Problem Means Going Beyond
Trolls, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK TECHNOLOGY (June 4, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/2013-06-04/fixing-americas-patent-problem-means-going-beyond-trolls (discussing the
Obama Administration's efforts to deal with bad patents); Tim Worstall, Crowdsourcing The
Fight Against Bad Software Patents, FORBES (July 23, 2013, 12:44 PM), http://www.forbes.coml
sites/timworstall2013/07/23/crowdsourcing-the-fight-against-bad-software-patents.
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could get along fine without patent protection," because, e.g.,
innovation is cheap, and a race-to-be-first (the so-called first mover
advantage) could drive research and development. 237 According to
Judge Posner, in industries where teams of salaried engineers make
minor advances in technology, the "improvement[s] will be made
anyway, without patent protection, as part of the normal competitive
process in markets where patents are unimportant. '" 23 8  Justice
Stevens expressed similar sentiments with respect to business
methods in his Bilski concurrence:
Companies have ample incentives to develop business methods even without patent
protection, because the competitive marketplace rewards companies that use more
efficient business methods .... Business innovation, moreover, generally does not entail
the same kinds of risk as does more traditional, technological innovation. It generally
does not require the same enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development,
and thus does not require the same kind of compensation to innovators for their labor,
toil, and expense.
2 3 9
The Court's present interpretation of § 101 could be understood as
reflective of this belief, aligning the Court with public perception that
patents do more harm than good. 24
0
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has not yet picked (or at least, articulated) any
particular legal justification for discovering or creating implicit
exceptions to § 101. Upon close examination, the several potential
rationales for the Court's opinions are not altogether satisfying.
Individually, they all have flaws. Collectively, though, they have
swayed the entire Court. This Article posits that the Court's
unanimous acceptance of the implicit exceptions may be explained as
an aggressive use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine: broad
patents on things too close to "abstract ideas" or "laws of nature"
237. Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents In America, THE ATLANTIC
(July 12, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/businessarchive/2012/07/why-there-are-
too-many-patents-in-america259725. Judge Posner contrasts these industries with the
pharmaceutical industry, which he acknowledges is a "prime example of an industry that really
does need [patent] protection" for a variety of reasons. Id.
238. Id.
239. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3254 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted).
240. See John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992-2012, 23 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 525, 526 (2013) (noting that "[tihe patent community has
become far more fractured, with many observers holding diverse perspectives on the
effectiveness and moral worth of the patent system"); Andrew Williams, When NPR Podcasters
Hit the Patent System, PATENT DoCs (June 12, 2013, 11:59 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2013/
06/when-npr-podcasters-hit-the-patent-system.html ("NPR has mounted what appears to be an
all-out assault on the allegedly 'broken' patent system .... It is no surprise that public opinion of
the patent system appears to be waning.").
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might impede progress, which might violate the preamble of the
Intellectual Property Clause. Like the Court in Prometheus, I say
"might" because the proposition is uncertain, both as a matter of fact
and a matter of law. If this uncertain constitutional conflict supplies
the basis for the implicit exceptions, they may be broad indeed. There
is no apparent limiting principle to a rule invalidating all patents that
might tend to slow progress, and that is quite a scary thought.

